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WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW? PERSPECTIVES FROM
CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN ACADEMY*
Louis E. Wolchert
It is an honor to be invited to address you at this celebration of the silver
anniversary of the Federal Bar Association for the Western District of
Washington. Please accept my congratulations on the health, longevity, and
high importance that your organization has achieved during the past quarter
century. I want to thank in particular your President, Kevin Swan, for
inviting me. He had the kindness (and I hope not the bad judgment) to
remember his old Federal Courts professor at the University of Washington
Law School, and to imagine that I might have something of interest or value
to say to you tonight.
The title of my talk is "What is the Rule of Law?"-and its subtitle is
"Perspectives from Central Europe and the American Academy." I represent
the "American Academy" part, and as I will make clear in a little while, the
other part comes from my sustained engagement, over the past ten years,
with legal theorists and political philosophers in the Republic of Slovenia.'
Slovenia, by the way, is a nation that was created twelve years ago as the
northernmost of those "breakaway" republics of the former Yugoslavia.
Before I begin developing my theme, permit me to say a relevant word or
two about my own personal background. For nearly a decade I was a
partner in the litigation department of a large San Francisco law firm, before
rising like a Phoenix, seventeen years ago, from the ashes of law practice
and into the rarefied air of the Ivory Tower. Now you will recall that the
Phoenix is a kind of bird, and some of you may even be tempted to say that
what we professors do in academic law is often a bit bird-brained. To those
of you who think this I will even admit that I specialize in what you might
be tempted to call the most bird-brained and useless academic field of all-
the philosophy of law. Nevertheless, if the Phoenix has a bird's brain it also
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has the ability to fly up for a bird's eye view, and I hope that this means we
can profitably think together about the Rule of Law from a "bird's eye
view," at least for the next twenty minutes or so.
At the time of our nation's founding, John Adams declared, in a very
famous epigram from his Novanglus Papers,2 that the most important
characteristic of a democratic republic consists in its being "a government
of laws and not men."3 Since men are not the only kind of people who can
acquire power these days (thankfully), I will take the liberty of updating
Adams' saying by deleting the word "men" in favor of the gender-neutral
term "people." Having done so, I surmise that a lot of people in this room
would probably say that they know exactly what Adams' epigram means.
But I have to confess to you that I am not one of them. Taking Adams'
saying as our initial indication of the Rule of Law, I for one am prone to
wonder, What on earth does this "Rule of Law" idea mean? And does it
mean the same thing everywhere? I will take these as my two guiding
questions tonight.
The habit of everyday life is usually not to question things too often or
too rigorously. But the utter questionability of the so-called "Rule of Law"
was brought home to me vividly in the early nineties, shortly after the fall of
the Berlin Wall, and after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the former
Yugoslavia. Due to a series of international exchanges and a Fulbright
award, I was able to acquire close professional and personal ties with
scholars at the University of Ljubljana School of Law, in Slovenia. This
small country achieved its independence in 1990 (for the first time in one
thousand years, by the way), and its intellectuals were (and still are)
struggling to think through and implement the meaning of "Democracy"
and the "Rule of Law" in a country that had officially known nothing but
the social and economic system of Communism and its official ideology for
halfa century. Although theirs is a genuine struggle for democracy and the
rule of law-I am sure of that-it is still worth asking what kind of
democracy and what kind of rule of law they are struggling to achieve. One
fact that made me really think about the ambiguity of the meaning of the
Rule of Law came from a survey of Slovene public opinion that was
conducted in 1996: Only twenty-four percent of those surveyed said that
they trusted the law courts and lawyers in Slovenia-indeed, the study
showed that the Slovene president, their police, their army, their educational
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institutions, and even their banks were all trusted at a significantly higher
level than were the courts.4 What was going on? And what does this
apparent contempt for law entail for the meaning of the Rule of Law in their
country and in ours?
Before I attempt to answer this question, let me say something about
John Adams' epigram that many of you may find rather shocking. There is
a very important sense in which the idea that democracy entails a
"government of laws and not of men" is complete and utter fantasy and
nonsense. I am referring explicitly to the idea that legal texts-rules,
decisions, principles-somehow automatically determine the actions of
those who apply them. I say that this idea is complete and utter fantasy and
nonsense because it incorrectly imagines that "laws" and "humans" reside
in two utterly different logical spaces-that THE LAW represents a realm
in which musty documents from the past push or can push people in the
present like so many levers on a complicated machine, and that humans,
who are fated always to live their lives in the present, are or can be
miserable slaves of the documents that they or their ancestors deposited in
the past.
In the curious dreamworld depicted in Adams' epigram, a great reversal
is enacted: Our own previous creations-legal texts and practices-come to
rule over us and dominate us like the multitude of self-replicating brooms
that are brought to life by the sorcerer's apprentice (played by Mickey
Mouse) in the famous Disney cartoon. In this picture THE LAW dominates
humans, rather than the other way around. This dehumanized idea of law,
wherein the human subject "becomes the object of his object" (to quote the
Chilean legal philosopher Rolando Gaete5) is brilliantly and vividly
depicted in Franz Kafka's great parable "Before the Law."'6 In that parable a
man from the country comes to the Door of the Law seeking admittance-
just like everyone else, he too wants to receive justice. But the doorkeeper
will not let him in, and so the man sits down and waits to be admitted later.
In fact, as he waits and waits the days grow into months, and the months
into years, until finally the man nears the end of his own life, without ever
once having been allowed admittance to the Law. As the man is dying, he
asks the doorkeeper just one last question: In all my years of waiting, he
4. See Louis Wolcher, Pavnik 's Theory of Legal Decisionmaking: An Introduction, 72 WASH. L.
REV. 469, 479 n.34 (1997).
5. Rolando Gaete, Technological Thinking and the Identity of Modern Law, in BULLETIN OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 6 (No. 9, Feb. 1993).
6. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 267-69 (Willa & Edwin Muir trans., 1937).
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wonders, why is it that no one else has ever come seeking admittance to the
Law? At the very moment of the man's demise, the doorkeeper at last
deigns to answer his question; the doorkeeper bends down and whispers:
"No one but you could gain admittance through this door, since this door
was intended for you. I am now going to shut it."
7
Kafka's parable appears in his novel The Trial.8 The book as a whole
depicts a bureaucratic nightmare-world corresponding to the fairy-tale
world that is projected by John Adams' sunny phrase "a government of
laws and not of men." In Kafka's world dehumanized legal institutions
relentlessly grind people down, and human freedom and spontaneity are
cruel illusions. But I have always thought that the good news in this
otherwise depressing novel comes from the parable "Before the Law," for in
its deepest meaning this parable says that legal domination and
emancipation are both absolutely impossible without constant human
participation. It took the gatekeeper's presence and implicit threats to keep
the man outside the Law, just as the man also kept himself outside the law
by failing to attempt an unauthorized entry. As for the man's being before
the Law in the teiporal sense of the word "before," the primordial
phenomenon of time assures that he could never in principle have entered
the door anyway! For there is no pause or gap in time-no stasis of time
between the past and the present-that could ever be filled by such a thing
as THE LAW before it gets received and applied in just the way that it is
received and applied. Therefore humans must always make their appearance
in time before the Law can appear, and never the other way around.
All of this implies that neither Kafka's nor Adams' worlds are even
remotely possible, metaphysically speaking. This is because legal texts
always require interpretation, and interpretation is always a human act. The
irruption of the human being in the act of interpretation occurs even in the
so-called "easy" case, where just this unique set of facts must be subsumed
(by a human!) under a general rule that never explicitly refers to these
particular facts as such. Even the quintessentially clear rule of chess that
"Bishops can move only on the diagonal" contains nothing within its four
comers about this particular move in this particular game. Someone-a
human-must make the rule apply in every instance of its application. It
was Plato, in the Phaedrus,9 who first drew attention to the fact that written
7. id. at 269.
8. id. at 267-69.
9. Plato, Phaedrus, in TH-E COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 475-525, at 521 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., 1961 ).
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words can never "speak" what they mean, since they themselves have no
understanding. 0 Only the one being who is endowed with logos (the power
of speech) has understanding, and that being is none other than the human
being.
It seems to me that this obvious but nonetheless profound truth shows
that each of us in this room is morally responsible, every day and every
minute, for keeping alive all aspects-good and bad-of the social world
that we inhabit. We do law-it does not do us. It follows that the most we
could ever achieve is "a government of laws interpreted by humans," and
that this state of affairs could never fairly be put into opposition to Adams'
so-called lawless "government of men." I know that it may sound a bit
sacrilegious to say it, but both tyrannies and democracies happen to be
governments "of men (and women)"-it's just that they are different kinds
of human ordering. From this point of view, even the practice of so-called
judicial "strict constructionism" is not exempt from the fundamental truth
that humans apply law, and not the other way around. To paraphrase von
Clausewitz's famous remark to the effect that war is the continuation of
politics by other means,'" it seems to me that "strict constructionism," "plain
meaning," and the jurisprudence of "original intent" are, notwithstanding
their pretensions, really just the continuation of interpretation by other
means. Indeed, these practices may actually reverse von Clausewitz's
epigram: for legal interpretation and application (considered as
quintessentially "political" acts) are, as Foucault suggests, really the
continuation of war (between classes and individuals) by other means.'2 Is it
not possible to gain an insight into the nature of law by viewing the venue
of the legal decision as a battlefield that is littered with the metaphorical
corpses of the losers? Indeed, the corpses are no longer metaphorical in the
case of the administration of the death penalty. In exercising the power over
life and death, the judicial system reveals what Walter Benjamin calls
"something rotten in law"' 3-namely, the secret that law is human violence
10. In MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PLATO'S SOPHIST 238 (Richard Kojcewicz & Andr& Schuwer trans.,
1997), Plato's rhetorical question about the nature of the written word in the Phaedrus dialogue is
beautifully translated as follows: "[D]o you really believe that what is written down could speak, as if it
had understanding?"
11. "War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political
relations, a carrying out of the same by other means." JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 448
(15th ed., 1980), (citing KARL VON CLAUSEWtTZ, VOM KRIEGE (ON WAR) (1833)).
12. MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED 165 (David Macey trans., 2003).
13. Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in WALTER BENJAMIN, REFLECTIONS, ESSAYS,
APHORISMS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 286 (Peter Demetz ed., E. Jephcott trans., 1986).
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through-and-through, and that it reaffirms itself as violence each time it
hands down a judgment.
When I was practicing law-and I conducted a dozen or so full-blown
trials and countless settlements in my years in the trenches-it became
manifestly clear to me how little "law" there is in the Law. The skill and
intelligence of the lawyers, the politics and peccadillos of judges, the
prejudices of juries, the sheer manipulability of legal texts and emotional
responses, not to mention the constructibility of the "facts," the brutal
reality that wealth matters enormously to the ability to gain access to the
law and to be successful at it: all of these factors, repeated countless times
in my practice, showed me that the "Rule of Law" names a particular kind
of rule of people, and not some radically pure kind of social arrangement.
The Legal Realists of the 1920s and 30s taught us all a valuable lesson
when they demonstrated, in field after field of law, the fundamental
indeterminacy of legal materials considered as mere "texts," and the ability
of the wealthy and the powerful to have a disproportionate share of
influence in those important interpretive moments when human beings use
the law as a justification for violence. 4 As the great and controversial
German legal theorist Carl Schmitt wrote, in his 1922 book Political
Theology: "Like every other order, the legal order rests on a decision, and
not on a norm."'' 5 The Slovene philosopher Slavoj Ziek recently gave us
this useful formulation of the unavoidable implication of Schmitt's
decisionism for the meaning of the Rule of Law: "The rule of law ultimately
hinges on an abyssal act of violence (violent imposition) grounded only in
itself: every positive statute to which this act refers in order to legitimate
itself is self-referentially posited by this act itself."' 6 In speaking about the
insight that there is an important sense in which people's actions are law, I
would be remiss if I did not also mention America's own John Chipman
Gray, whose important book, The Nature and Sources of the Law, attempted
to demonstrate that in a democracy the ultimate sovereign power to declare
"what the law is" does not really reside in the people or their legislature, but
14. See, e.g., WILLIAM FISHER Ill ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1993) (collection of articles
written by American Legal Realists between 1881 and 1950).
15. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 10
(George Schwab trans., 1988) (1st German ed. 1922).
16. SLAVOJ ZIEK, TIHE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 113-14
(1999).
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in the judiciary, whose interpretations of legal texts in every real sense are
the "Rule of Law.'
17
Or so I thought, until I got to know my friends in Slovenia who are trying
to build their own version of the Rule of Law. They confront a national
environment in which the people at large distrust and disdain law and
lawyers, owing largely to the practices of party bosses in the former
Yugoslav era. In those days, the political officials of the state and the party
routinely interfered and intervened in legal disputes to dictate outcomes,
operating under Marx's thesis that bourgeois law is but a temporary
expedient that is destined to wither away when socialism becomes fully
established in the minds and hearts of the people. The result of this practice
in the old Yugoslavia included the arrests of countless dissidents, as well as
show trials in which there was only one permissible outcome-conviction
and, in some cases, execution.
For my friends in Slovenia the "Rule of Law" did not mean the
metaphysically impossible capacity of legal texts to "constrain" and
"determine" the behavior of those judges who apply them. It meant, rather,
somehow obtaining a judiciary that actuallyfelt itself to be independent of
the more overtly political branches of government, to such an extent that
judges would actually stand up to the executive and legislative branches-
as Chief Justice Marshall did in Marbury v. Madison"8-and hold them
accountable for failing to abide by fundamental norms of human rights. In
short, I came to learn that in Slovenia the "Rule of Law" meant, first and
foremost, a separation of powers in which the judicial power is real and
concrete, and not merely formal.
From their point of view, my friends told me, it would be an incredible
luxury to be in a position to worry and fret, as some American politicians do
today, about whether or not a particular judge is an "activist." Such a
problem, they told me, could only be perceived as a problem in a social
context in which civil respect for law and legal institutions is already well-
established-in fact, where it is ingrained in the respect that people show
for judicial authority. Respect for authority of any kind is not something
that occurs overnight, and once lost it is very difficult to regain. For
Slovene intellectuals the decision in favor of the Rule of Law has been a
decision for the formal principle ofjudicial ordering as such; the contingent
content of that ordering is for them in many ways beside the point (at least
17. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 54 (David Campbell & Philip
Thomas eds., 1997) (1st ed. 1909).
18. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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for the time being). They would love to have judges, activist or not, who are
not crushingly beholden to political actors-judges who feel themselves
able and willing to stand up to the executive and legislative branches of
government, as well as to the multi-national corporations who would like to
exploit Slovenia's resources by "special deals" that benefit only the few.
This insight into the problems that my Slovene colleagues face has made
an enormous impact on my own thinking about the meaning of the Rule of
Law. On the one hand, I feel even more sure than ever that there exists no
golden "metaphysical certainty" in law, only the base metal of what I will
call social certainty. The only reason judges think that THE LAW controls
them is that they belong to a social group (lawyers and judges) whose
members respond pretty much in similar ways to similar problems of
application. That kind of relatively uniform social response is wired into us
by our legal and social training. It shows, for example, why most people
just stop at a stop sign, without first thinking, "Does this rule really apply to
me in just this context?"' 9 In other words, much (even most) of law consists
of routinized behavior-almost as if people were mindlessly plodding
through a great deal of their lives like mules in harness. The idea that law is
in many respects socially (but not metaphysically) determinate means that
John Adams' "government of laws and not of men" really describes a
government of social tendencies about which we rarely think and of which
we are rarely aware. The danger that this unthinking process of social
interpretation and enforcement can become a tool of special interests,
power, prejudice, and injustice is very real. We need only consult our own
shameful history of legalized slavery and apartheid to confirm this. But-
and this is a big but-the "capture" of law by injustice is possible only if
those who apply the law are respected sources of authority in the first
place!
As I see it, social power is social power, whether it is called "public" or
"private." The humiliations that an overweening and obnoxious boss in the
private sector inflicts on a secretary who badly needs the job are every bit as
hurtful as a similar round of mistreatment dealt by an uncaring state official
to a needy supplicant. Whether it is public or private, power always craves
to reinforce and extend itself wherever and however it can. In this respect I
side with Nietzsche, for experience teaches me (as it did him) that the
primordial instinct of Will-to-Power is a ubiquitous and overweening "force
19. Schmitt makes the same point by referring to our attitude about timetables: "I am often less
interested in how a timetable determines times of departure and arrival in a particular case than in its
functioning reliably." SCHMIrT, supra note 15, at 30-3 1.
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of all forces" in social life.2° In the former Yugoslavia, social power
attempted to reinforce itself by means of more-or-less direct command and
control by a cadre of leaders at the top. In our society, congealed units of
social power (e.g., large corporations) are always attempting to enhance
themselves by means of the law-by using the law to their advantage. The
main difference is that the social institution ofjudicial independence in our
country tends to open up a larger space for what I will call "counter-
hegemonic struggle."
Don't get me wrong!-I am no Pollyanna when it comes to thinking
about the potential of our system to radically emancipate human beings. It is
quite clear to me that in the current political war against so-called "frivolous
lawsuits" and against publicly funded legal services for the poor, in habeas
corpus "reform" and in immigration laws that cut back on judicial review,
in the conservative drum-beat for universal "tort reform," in recent drastic
curtailments of civil liberties and access to courts in the interest of "security
from terrorism," and in countless other ways, today's bastions of congealed
social power have mounted a broad and effective counter-attack on the use
of law by the powerless. But be that as it may, this battle against the
powerless must still be waged on a legal terrain that is at least somewhat
unpredictable, owing to the diffusion of power that is represented by the
institution of judicial independence and widespread respect for that
independence. If Legal Realism taught us how the rich and powerful get to
stack the deck of the law in their favor, the story I have told you tonight
about Slovenia's struggles to achieve democracy ought to teach us to be
grateful that at least there is a legal game to play in our country-a place in
law where people have at least some chance to resist abuse by the powerful,
and where judges just might agree with them and do something about it. As
I see it, the possibility of access to an institutional place where power does
not always get what it wants is none other than the possibility of Justice
through law.
What all of this says is that the Rule of Law means something quite a bit
more realistic than John Adams' trite expression would have it mean. It
seems to me that if the Rule of Law sometimes (or even often) can be used
as a tool by the powerful, it can also occasionally be wielded as a force to
hold power accountable. Its proper home lies within institutions staffed by
men and women who do not reflexively do the bidding of the elite, but who
actually delve into the past for documents and practices that might be
20. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 261-453 (Walter Kaufmann & R.. Hollingdale
trans., 1968).
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interpreted (always in the present!) to the disadvantage of the elite. From
the standpoint of Justice, the Rule of Law is the chance to use social power
to thwart social power-a brutally realistic but refreshingly honest
realization that my Slovene colleagues came to more than a decade ago.
Viewed in its proper light, then, and shorn of all its silly metaphysical
pretensions, the realistic idea of the Rule of Law that I have attempted to
describe to you tonight strikes me as an important cultural achievement, at
least for those who value the moral worth of the individual as an ultimate
value. In the marketplace we are constantly required to prove our worth by
our value to those with the means to pay us in money and prestige. But the
Rule of Law is the possibility-however remote-that our worth as human
beings is not solely determined by our market price, or by the powerful
people we happen to know. But if the Rule of Law in this sense is an
achievement, it is also an achievement that must be continually won, over
and over again, in concrete struggles before fiercely independent and
courageous judges. I speak here of judges who know that the violence of
law is always their doing, manifested in the interpretations they give. These
are judges who do not think of themselves as cogs in a soul-less legal
machine, but as creative and responsible actors in an unfolding and
uncertain historical drama. It strikes me that such a humanized version of
the Rule of Law might be well worth fighting for.
Thank you very much for listening to me so patiently, and good night to
you all.
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